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Abstract
Military might and political elites’ commercial mindset are two important
preconditions that explain nations’ economic income differences. The combination
of elites’ economic risk appetite and its bargain power at the national and
international arenas sustained by its own military might lead to the array of
economic outcomes achieved by nations over time. To the best of our knowledge,
the proposed argument fits historical evidence but has not been properly developed
by the previous literature.
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1. Introduction
Factor accumulation by itself does not explain persistent differences in growth rates across
countries. After adjusting for factor endowment levels, including human capital and R&D, recent
economic literature highlights the importance of institutions as a critical input accounting for
income differences (Hall and Jones, 1999; Easterly and Levine, 2001; Rodrik et al., 2004;
Helpman, 2008; Góes, 2016; Zergawu et al., 2020).
Thus, “the central issue of economic history and economic development [has been] to account
for the evolution of political and economic institutions that create an economic environment that
induces increasing productivity” (North, 1991: 98). So far, this strand of the literature has
devoted its attention to the development of inclusive institutions that allow societies as a whole
to prosper (Sen, 1999; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012) and to how these inclusive institutions
may flourish, persist and evolve upon different political equilibria (Acemoglu, Johnson and
Robinson, 2002; Acemoglu, 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006a; Chang, 2010).
However, to the best of our knowledge, most of the institutional literature sticks with describing
a world of sovereign (say, self-governed) nations, bypassing international coercion and,
therefore, the historical importance of a third nation’s (or coalition of nations’) military power
shaping the international economic order. At the same time, institutional developments tend to
assume that (sovereign) political elites behave as wealth maximizers, subject just to staying in
power (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006b). In doing so, this literature has scarcely explained why
some elites did not actually behave like wealth maximizers and promoted pro-growth policies.
The aim of this paper is to contribute to fill this void in the literature.
Taking an international approach, and ceteris paribus factor endowments issues, essential for
economic growth (Marx, 1867; Gerschenkron, 1962; Solow, 1956; Lucas, 1988; Easterly and
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Levine, 2003), we argue that military might and political elites’ commercial mindset are
preconditions that pave the way for nations’ economic income differences. To the best of our
knowledge, the proposed argument, built on the institutional literature that highlights the power
of ideas for influencing economic policy (Keynes, 1936; Rodrik, 2014; Mukand and Rodrik,
2018), fits historical evidence and has not been put together in the literature.
On the one hand, military hegemony allows a nation (or coalition of nations) to impose selfbenefiting norms on others, as well as to avoid being forced to adopt undesired rules. In sum,
military hegemony is a prerequisite for self-government, particularly in a context of loose
international rules of sovereignty. At the same time, however, military power entails political and
economic costs that might eventually erode the capacity to influence policy (Kennedy, 1989;
Dunne and Tian, 2013).
On the other hand, even a sovereign nation may not implement market-friendly policies due to
the political elites’ commercial mindset. In short, risk appetite—trade propensity being one of its
manifestations—differs across national political elites, which explains why growth-inducing
policies are not ubiquitously implemented. This might be driven by cultural reasons and specific
economic interests, and it depends to a certain extent on the degree of threat to the status quo.
The paper is organized as follows. The next two sections explore, respectively, the role of
military power and elites’ commercial mindset as preconditions for economic success. The
fourth section highlights some final remarks.
2. Vae Victis! Military Power as Precondition for Nations’ Economic Success
Markets are artefactual creations whose rules are shaped by dominant players benefiting from
their superior bargaining power (Polanyi, 1944; North, 1990). The mightiest nation (or coalition)
2

is therefore able to exert its power to set self-benefiting commercial rules, as trade (Findlay and
O’Rourke, 2009; Rodrik, 2018) and peace agreements (Keynes, 1919) illustrate. The negative
consequences of being on the wrong side of the bargaining table are clearly exemplified by the
Indian deindustrialization in the nineteenth century amid the British-imposed trade regulation
(Parthasarathi, 2011).
It naturally follows that military might does not only allow the hegemon (or coalition) to set the
rules of the game to its benefit, but it also provides security against external aggression.
Economic growth and richness in the absence of coercive capacity may induce predation by
other polities because the marginal benefits of domination may exceed its costs (Geloso and
Salter, 2020). This might be of particular concern in the context of weak international rules of
sovereignty, in which direct conquest and subjugation are accepted policy solutions to
international conflicts. The lack of state capacity to protect the economy from external predation
has been indeed related with truncated experiences of economic growth, such as in the case of
ancient Greece or medieval Europe (Johnson and Koyama, 2016).
Military power, therefore, guarantees self-government and the possibility of economic growth, at
the same time that it constrains internal unrest. However, coercive capacity may come at a price.
Firstly, powerful armies may constitute a serious threat to civil political and economic elites, as
they have the resources to overthrow the government and to impose regime change (Besley and
Robinson, 2010). Secondly, military hegemons may succumb to the costs of empire.
International commitments might overburden them to the extent of undermining their very same
hegemony and capacity to influence policy (Kennedy, 1989). Finally, military expenditure might
affect growth negatively through indebtedness, fiscal pressure, the crowding out of non-military

3

public spending, and by igniting costly and disrupting arms races (Dunne and Tian, 2013).
Hegemons, thus, must not simply build up military power, but must exercise it thoughtfully.
In this regard, the political elite in a hegemon nation (or coalition) has to choose the way to exert
that power, both abroad and at home. For the purposes of this paper, let us now focus on the
implications of military hegemony from an international perspective. Building on Olson’s
seminal paper (1993), the options at their disposal range from stationary bandit to allowing for
the growth of market-friendly inclusive institutions (Smith, 1776; Hayek, 1988; Nunn, 2008;
Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). In case the profits arising from economic dominance outnumber
the costs of subjugation, the hegemon nation (or coalition) will have an incentive to act as a
stationary bandit. In this situation, it can either take some regular tribute from third nations,
impose trade rules benefiting its own economic structure, or go for both. Depending on its
economic appetite and policy toolkit, the hegemon can even opt for isolationism and simply
protect its own jurisdiction from external attacks (as ancient China did). The next section of this
paper is precisely devoted to the analysis of elites’ commercial attitudes reflected in economic
policy.
3. Political Elites’ Commercial Mindset: Towards the Entrepreneurial State 1
The importance of public sector intervention is based on its combining action of regulation and
spending, which has made the state the most influential economic agent over time. This is why a
wide strand of the public sector and institutional economic literature has devoted attention to the

1
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analysis of economic policies’ incentives, designers and beneficiaries (Stigler, 1971; Wolf, 1986;
Chang, 2002; Mazzucato, 2013).2
Here, as in the realm of military power, political elites have the ability to influence policy
(Polanyi, 1994; North, 1990; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006a; Greif and Mokyr, 2017). To begin
with, they can shape the functioning of markets by altering the rules in place (Chang, 2002).
Secondly, elites’ preferences (or those of national coalitions of power, given democratic rule)
exert disproportionate influence on policy-making and public spending decisions (Gilens and
Page, 2014). Thirdly, elites can also open new market opportunities through investment and
research (notably in the 20th and 21st centuries), the profits of which may be captured depending
on how policies were designed (Mazzucato, 2013).
However, elites with low risk appetite have historically not embarked the public sector in
promoting growth, but just in policing the maintenance of the status quo. It is precisely the
political elites’ commercial appetite that matters in order to explain why some military hegemons
do not become economic hegemons and, at the same time, why they try to (or not) influence
third nations’ economic policy, notably in trade agreements (Rodrik, 2018). In fact, elites can
seek for inclusive or extractive international economic orders, as a new strand of the institutional
literature points out (Varoufakis, 2011; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; López Castellano and
López Quero, 2019).
The commercial appetite of the elites may be driven by cultural, historical, or even religious
motives, and hinges to a certain extent on how secure they feel in power (Rodrik, 2014; Mukand
On the most basic level, we have already mentioned that the state’s military might contributes to guaranteeing
external security and defending economic interests abroad (O’Brien, 2011). A peaceful environment that secures
property rights has indeed been linked to more investment over the long run (Smith, 1776; Olson, 1993), the better if
additional investment-friendly institutions are also effectively in force (Chang, 2002; Acemoglu and Robinson,
2012).

2
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and Rodrik, 2018). In the absence of major threats against the status quo, elites would just block
any reform they think that may eventually harm their interests, no matter its impact on economic
growth (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006 and 2012). On the contrary, elites whose power is
threatened by other ascending (and thus, competing) elites will tend to embark the state in
promoting social welfare through pro-growth policies (and even redistributive ones, see Lindert,
2004a and 2004b) in order to appease social unrest and to retain their status, especially when
repression costs become too high.
4. Final Remarks
This paper proposes military might and political elites’ commercial mindset as preconditions for
explaining nations’ income differences over time. This argument fits the historical evidence but
has not been properly developed by the previous literature. A natural extension of this work
might be to apply our reasoning to past and current episodes of international economic equilibria,
such us the era of Pax Britannica. A second and empirical extension of this paper would be to
contrast econometrically the economic implications of peace and commercial treaties, controlling
for the military power of the opposing parties. Peace and trade treaties emerge as historical
evidence of the degree of elites’ commercial appetite. Last but not least, a third research avenue
stemming from this paper would be to extend our framework in order to contribute to the
literature on how bottom-up social interactions may influence political elites’ commercial
mindset.
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